Not uncommonly, a preference complaint fails to adequately allege that the transfers sought to be recovered by the trustee were made “for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made”, as required under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, when faced with a complaint to recover alleged preferential transfers, a defendant can proceed in one of two ways: (i) file an answer and raise affirmative defenses, or (ii) move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Generally, if a motion to dismiss is filed on this basis, the Court will grant plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to adequately assert that such transfers are recoverable under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  But does the analysis change if the trustee files an amended complaint which continues to fail to meet pleading standards, and defendant once again moves to dismiss?

This question was addressed in the recent Delaware Bankruptcy Court decision of Solmonese v. Shyamsundar, et al. (In re AmCad Holdings, LLC, et al.), Adv. No. 15-51979 (Del. Bankr. Apr. 7, 2017).  There, the Liquidating Trustee commenced a lawsuit against defendants, which included former directors and officers of AmCad Holdings, LLC, et al. (“Debtors” or “AmCad”), for breach of fiduciary duty, preferential transfers, and claim disallowance.  The Court previously dismissed the original complaint because it lacked “related-to” jurisdiction over the fiduciary duty claims, and because the preference claims were not adequately pled.  The Liquidating Trustee was permitted to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies as it related to the preference claims.

The Liquidating Trustee filed the Amended Complaint seeking to avoid and recover $651,496.50 of alleged preferential transfers made to Visagar M. Shyamsundar (“Defendant”) within one year of the petition date pursuant to sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Defendant again moved to dismiss, asserting that the Amended Complaint continued to fail to adequately allege that the transfers were made for or on account of an antecedent debt.

The Court granted dismissal as to five of the alleged transfers to Defendant for “car payments,” “payroll,” and “records storage”, totaling approximately $100,000. The Court held that the allegations did not support a claim that they were made in satisfaction of an antecedent debt owed to the Defendant.

In addition, the Court separately dismissed these transfers from the Amended Complaint because the Liquidating Trustee failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating insolvency.  While insolvency is presumed within the 90 day period prior to the bankruptcy filing, the burden rests with a trustee to adequately allege insolvency for claims arising before such 90 day period.

Finally, the Court denied the Liquidating Trustee’s request to further amend as to the aforementioned transfers.  The Court noted that the Liquidating Trustee was put on notice of his deficiencies when the Court previously granted dismissal of the original Complaint, and did little to correct the deficiencies.  See Krantz v. Prudential Invs., 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002) (denying leave to amend previously amended complaint where motion to dismiss original complaint put plaintiff on notice of deficiencies, yet plaintiff failed to rectify them in his first amended complaint).  Accordingly, dismissal was granted with prejudice as to the five aforementioned transfers.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In a 33 page decision released March 29, 2017, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court ruled on competing motions to dismiss the remaining claims and counterclaims in an adversary proceeding in the Affirmative Insurance bankruptcy – Adversary Proceeding Case No. 16-50425.  Judge Sontchi’s opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).  As Judge Sontchi stated in the Opinion, the issue was a simple one, Opinion at *3, there is a dispute of a material fact between the parties, and dismissal is therefor inappropriate.  Opinion at *4.

The issue arises as the result of the allocation of sales proceeds between parties with a claim on the debtor’s assets.  The plan appointed liquidator (the “AIC Liquidator”) asserts that the funds from the sale should be in its control pursuant to the plan, and held in trust to pay the estate’s tax liability.  Opinion at *12.  JCF AFFM Debt Holdings, L.P. (“JCF”) is the other party in interest in the Opinion.  JCF was a major lender to the debtor, and claimed to hold a validly perfected security interest in the account into which the sales proceeds were eventually deposited.

JCF had filed the complaint that initiated the adversary proceeding.  The AIC Liquidator filed its counterclaims and also moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that this was a conflict between two creditors with no impact on the Debtor.

Judge Sontchi first addressed the argument of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that “the threshold question here is whether the funds [at issue] are property of the estate or not.”  Opinion at *21.  As Judge Sontchi ruled, the account at issue is in the name of the Debtor, and accordingly, “its funds are presumably property of the estate under section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.” Opinion at *26. Citing In re BankUnited Financial, Judge Sontchi instructed that “what is or is not property of a bankruptcy estate is an issue that stems from the bankruptcy itself, one that can only arise in a bankruptcy proceeding…”  Opinion at *28.

On pages 31 and 32 Judge Sontchi examines the counterclaims and whether they should be dismissed.  It is interesting to note that a key aspect of his analysis, as I read the Opinion, is the remedy sought in the counterclaims – establishment of a constructive trust.  Judge Sontchi states: “The imposition of a constructive trust may be an appropriate remedy for any of the causes of action asserted.  Thus, if the AIC Liquidator prevails on any of the counterclaims it would be determinative of the ultimate issue of whether the funds are property of the estate. The Court finds that the Counterclaims contain specific factual allegations, taken they are true, to suggest that the AIC Liquidator is entitled to the funds in the …Account.. As such, it is apparent that there is a dispute of a material fact.”  I can’t help but wonder, if the counterclaims had sought relief of a different sort, such as damages, would the outcome have been the same?

At the end of the day, it’s hard to argue that a bankruptcy court doesn’t have jurisdiction over a matter that can, by definition, only arise in a bankruptcy – including determining what constitutes a debtor’s estate.  The determination of what is property of a debtor’s estate is a highly fact sensitive issue, and if there are facts in dispute, it is unlikely that a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss will be granted.  We will, no doubt, continue to see them filed as they play an important role in narrowing the scope of a conflict, but in my experience and observation of the bankruptcy court, they are denied far more frequently than they are granted.

John Bird practices with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. You can reach John at 302-622-4263, or jbird@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017), Judge Sontchi held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to counsel to the creditors committee in a case with a confirmed chapter 11 plan.

The DIP financing order contained a 250K carve-out for committee fees incurred in investigating claims against the lender.  After its investigation, the committee filed a motion seeking standing to pursue certain causes of action against the lender.  The parties then mediated and reached a global settlement agreement that paved the way for a consensual plan of reorganization.

After confirmation, the committee’s counsel requested $8.5 million in fees and 226K in costs.  The lender argued that the 250K carve-out in the DIP financing order constituted an absolute cap on fee payments.  The committee’s counsel responded that while the carve-out cap may have been relevant in an administratively insolvent case, it was irrelevant in a case with a confirmed chapter 11 plan.  The court agreed.

The court explained that “[t]he carve-out is essentially an agreement by the secured creditor to subordinate its liens and claims to certain allowed administrative expenses, permitting such professionals’ fees to come first in terms of payment from the estate’s assets. . . .  [W]hen there are insufficient unencumbered assets to pay professionals’ fees and no plan has been confirmed, professionals’ only recourse is the carve-out.”

Here, however, because a plan was confirmed, Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(9)(A) required that, unless agreed otherwise, each holder of an administrative claim will receive cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim on the effective date of the plan.  Hence, “if the secured parties desire confirmation, the administration claims must be paid in full in cash at confirmation even it if means invading their collateral.”

The Court found that the carve-out language was “not different than a standard carve-out provision.  It does not connote in any way that the dollar-amount cap would operate as a complete bar against the allowance of administrative claims following plan confirmation.  In this respect, the dollar-amount cap was going to come into play if the attempts to confirm a reorganization plan had failed; it was not intended to come into play if a Chapter 11 plan was confirmed.”

Because the Court’s appointed fee examiner recommended (with minor adjustments) approval of the $8.5 million in fees and 226K in costs requested as reasonable compensation for actual and necessary services, the Court ordered their payment.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

Serving as an illustration of the principal that a financial restructuring won’t save a business that has ceased to be frequented by customers, RadioShack has filed for bankruptcy for the second time in as many years.  The prior case was filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware as case no. 15-10197.  This case is also in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and is case no. 17-10506.  Prime Clerk is the noticing agent in both cases and maintains a copy of the Court’s docket on its website – http://www.primeclerk.com/case-archive/.

The first bankruptcy had three primary results: 1) RadioShack closed approximately 2,400 stores, 2) the remaining stores were sold as a going concern to General Wireless, Inc., and 3) an agreement was entered into with Sprint, providing for co-branded product, exclusive access for Sprint within the RadioShack stores, and the payment of a portion of RadioShack rents by Sprint.

At the time of this second bankruptcy filing, there were over 1,500 stores in operation.  According to the first day declaration of Dene Rogers (the “Rogers Declaration”) in support of this bankruptcy, RadioShack is again seeking to shed underperforming leases and pursue a sale or restructuring.  As part of this process, it has transferred 115 stores to Sprint in exchange for a $12 million payment and the termination of the Sprint agreement, with the possibility of receiving another $5 million following an investigation period.

RadioShack has sought authority to close and liquidate the inventory of “between 530 and substantially all of their stores.”  See Rogers Declaration at 22.  Accordingly, creditors will want to keep close tabs on this case to make sure that any debts owed or claims they may have are not eliminated.

John Bird is a bankruptcy attorney with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  John is admitted in Delaware and regularly practices before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. You can reach John at (302) 622-4263 or at jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On March 2, 2017, Cal Dive Offshore Contractors, Inc. (“Cal Dive” or “Debtor”) filed approximately 136 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Cal Dive and its affiliated debtors filed voluntary petitions for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on March 3, 2015 under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  According to each complaint, Cal Dive “constituted a global marine contractor that provided highly specialized manned diving, pipelay and pipe burial, platform installation and salvage, and well-intervention services to a diverse customer base in the offshore oil and gas industry.”

The various avoidance actions are pending before the Honorable Christopher S. Sontchi.  The pretrial conference has not yet been scheduled.

For preference defendants looking for an analysis of defenses that can be asserted in response to a preference complaint, below are several articles on this topic:

Preference Payments: Brief Analysis of Preference Actions and Common Defenses

Minimizing Preference Exposure: Require Prepayment for Goods or Services

Minimizing Preference Exposure (Part II) – Contemporaneous Exchanges

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

On February 28, 2017, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Money Center of America  bankruptcy – Bankr. D. Del., Case 14-10603.  The Opinion is available here.  This Opinion decided two separate, but similar, motions to dismiss filed by 2 entities owned by federally recognized Indian Tribes and sovereign nations (the “Tribes”).  Each of these Tribes owned a casino (through wholly owned entities) in which the Debtor placed ATMs and other cash advance services, in order to allow casino patrons ready access to funds.  The process that was followed in each case is that the Debtor would provide the ATM or service, the casino would advance the funds by providing payments and stocking the ATMs, and the Debtor would reimburse the casinos from the funds transferred by the patrons’ banks.  In this process, the Debtor would also charge the patrons a fee, funding its operations.

This was a process in which large sums of money flowed, but with little direct benefit to the casinos or the Debtor, as the majority of funds came from a patron’s bank and was paid to the patron.  Of course, I make no judgment as to how much additional profit this allowed the casinos to recognize, as the direct and initial transfers involved were to the patrons, through the casinos and Debtor.  Naturally, the Debtor was required to make frequent payments to the casinos as reimbursement for funds advanced and, following the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing and the appointment of the Trustee in this bankruptcy, significant preference and fraudulent conveyance lawsuits were initiated.

The Opinion

Judge Sontchi carefully weighs several issues in this Opinion, ultimately holding that (1) the Tribes sovereign immunity arguments are to be considered as Rule 12 motions, not as affirmative defenses [Opinion at *15], (2) the casinos enjoy the sovereign immunity of the Tribes [Opinion at *22], (3) the Bankruptcy Code does no abrogate the sovereign immunity [Opinion at *27], and (4) the filing of a claim by one of the Tribes will allow the Trustee’s action to proceed solely to determine if the preference action can recoup the amount of the claim [Opinion at *36].

This is a lengthy opinion, containing a large number of citations to controlling authority.  At no point did Judge Sontchi gloss over any of the case law supporting his holdings.  Accordingly, I consider this Opinion to be important reading material for any attorneys involved in preference litigation against foreign sovereigns.  It also makes me regret not having taken the class on “Native American Law” when in school – the issues involved are very interesting.

We have published a number of posts about preference actions on this blog.  The key issue of note here, is that many trustee’s merely look at a debtor’s check register and sue each and every recipient of transfers in the 90-day time period immediately preceding the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  As this is what is allowed under the Bankruptcy Code, this is the procedure most frequently used by trustees.  Most of the time, the trustee involved has an informational problem and the only way to start talking with opposing parties in is to file suit.  I haven’t ever had a conversation go well when it starts, “you might owe me money and I’d like to talk to you about whether you do.”  But this is exactly the situation trustees often find themselves in.

If you are a named defendant in a preference action, the first step is to make sure you understand the law surrounding preference litigation.  Educate yourself, then have your lawyer start a dialogue with the Trustee’s lawyer.  The vast majority of preference actions settle or are dismissed once the parties understand whether there were actual preference payments or not.  If you are in the lucky position to have not yet had a client or customer go through bankruptcy, (1) count yourself lucky and (2) start making plans to protect yourself for when one of them does go under.  It isn’t pretty, but since most of us aren’t foreign sovereigns, we need to plan carefully toy reduce our preference exposure.

John Bird practices with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. You can reach John at 302-622-4263, or jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On February 21, 2017, Judge Silverstein of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Outer Harbor Terminal bankruptcy proceeding – Bankr. D. Del., Case 16-10283.  The Opinion is available here.  This Opinion decided the Debtor’s objection to a claim for breach of contract filed by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (“K Line”).  The claim objection objected both to the amount of the K Line claim, and to the very existence of the K Line claim.  The Opinion only addressed the claim’s validity and did not liquidate the claim.  That issue was reserved by Judge Silverstein for a later trial.  However, I’m of the opinion that the amount of the claim will be determined consensually, as most issues are in bankruptcy proceedings.

Background

In 2013, K Line entered into an agreement with the Debtor to provide stevedoring and terminal services at the Port of Oakland.  Opinion at *2.  Unfortunately, the Debtor was never profitable and, in 2016, declared bankruptcy.  With that action in mind, on January 21, 2016, the Debtor provided notice to K Line that it would be winding down operations and intended to cease handling vessels as of February 20, 2016 and cease handling gates as of March 19, 2016.  However, the Debtor serviced K Line through March 28, 2016.  In anticipation of the Debtor’s termination of services, on March 4, 2016, K Line found a new provider of services and entered an agreement accordingly.  K Line then filed a claim in this bankruptcy case, and the Debtor objected on November 4, 2016.  An evidentiary hearing was held January 12, 2017 and this Opinion followed.  Opinion at *2-4.

The Opinion

Judge Silverstein focused entirely on the Agreement and the actions of the parties, needing to look no further than the document and the testimony of the Debtor.  She cited to the following chain of logic in making her decision:  1) The Agreement allowed either party to terminate immediately upon certain events occurring, including bankruptcy, Opinion at *7; 2) The Agreement does not provide that termination is self-executing, Opinion at *8; 3) Neither Debtor’s counsel, nor the witness it presented at the hearing testified or argued that the Debtor communicated to K Line that the Agreement was terminated, Opinion at *8-9.

Judge Silverstein makes it clear that although the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, it will not rewrite contracts.  “Just as the Court cannot rewrite the Agreement to save ‘K’ Line from a bad bargain, it cannot rewrite the Agreement to save the Debtor from any perceived penalty resulting from its choice to be a good corporate citizen.”  Opinion at *10.  Judge Silverstein held that the announcements of upcoming work stoppage appear to have been a repudiation.  Opinion at *11.  Pursuant to California law, which controlled the Agreement, a party injured by repudiation can elect its remedy, either treating the repudiation as anticipatory breach and seek damages, or ignore the repudiation, await the time when performance is due and exercise remedies for the actual breach.  In this instance, however, neither party briefed the issue of anticipatory breach or damages.  Accordingly Judge Silverstein “grant[ed]” them the opportunity to brief the issue in connection with a damages trial.  Opinion at *12.

Contract law is a part of nearly every business transaction – from retaining employees, to selling goods or services, to finding ways to protect your assets and business opportunities.  While the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, at the end of the day, all of the judges have studied contract law (even if only in preparation for the bar), and will give parties to a contract the benefit (or loss) of their bargains.  It is my hope that all of you reading this post will not need to exercise contractual protections.  But in today’s volatile business environment, even if all the parties to a contract are acting in good faith, a good contract, and following it closely, is the best protection for your business.  Should you ever have a contract counter-party encourage you to push through an incomplete contract, it may do well to remind them, and yourself, that strong fences build strong neighbors.

John Bird practices with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. You can reach John at 302-622-4263, or jbird@foxrothschild.com.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) released an update to the Local Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Delaware (Effective February 1, 2017) (the “Local Rules”).  According to Local Rule 1001-1(e), the 2017 version of the Local Rules governs all cases or proceedings filed after February 1, 2017, and also applies to proceedings pending on the effective date, except to the extent that the Court finds that it would not be feasible or would work an injustice.

A summary of the amendments is below:

New LR 3016-1 – Requires any amended Plan or Disclosure Statement to include a redline showing changes from the previous version.

New LR 9029-2 –Cross-Border Insolvency Matters – refers to new Part X of the local rules.

New LR 9033-1 – Transmittal to District Court of Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

New Part X – Guidelines for Communication and Cooperation Between Courts in Cross-Border Insolvency Matters.

Rule 2002-1(f)(viii) – The amendment requires the claims agent to make the complete Proof of Claim and attachments “viewable and accessible by the public”.

Rule 2016-2(e)(iii) – adds language allowing $0.80 per page for color copy charges (B&W remains $0.10 per page).  Outgoing fax charges reduced from $1.00 per page to $0.25 per page.

Rule 3023-1(b)(i)(B) – new sub-section on Nonstandard Plan Provisions added.

Rule 9013-1 – Motions and Applications – numerous language changes throughout the Rule.

Rule 9018-1:

(a) – New subsection stating that exhibits entered into evidence must be retained by counsel until the later of the closing of the main case or entry of a final non-appealable order.

(b) – Parties must make exhibits admitted into evidence available to any other party at its expense (subject to confidentiality).

(c) – Motions to seal do not require a motion to shorten notice, objections may be presented at the hearing.

A link to the 2017 Local Rules can be found here.  In addition, a redline reflecting the changes between the 2016 and 2017 Local rules can be found here.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of Spizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. (In re Ampal-American Israel Corp.), 2017 WL 75750 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2017), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a preference complaint filed by a trustee of chapter 7 debtor headquartered in Israel, where the payment was made from the debtor’s Israeli bank to an Israeli supplier.  The Court held that Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code does not have extraterritorial effect and the transfer did not originate in the U.S.

Within 90 days before bankruptcy, the debtor wired money from the debtor’s Israeli bank account to the supplier’s Israeli bank account, on account of an antecedent debt.  The chapter 7 trustee sued the supplier to avoid and recover the alleged preferential payment.  The supplier asserted that Section 547 could not be applied extraterritorially.

Judge Bernstein observed that the “presumption against extraterritoriality” is a “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”  In Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), the United States Supreme Court outlined a two-step approach to determine whether the presumption forecloses a claim.

First, the court asks “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”  If not, the court must turn to the second step to determine if the litigation involves an extraterritorial application of the statute.  Second, the court determines “whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, . . . by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’ . . . [I]f the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”

In applying this analysis, the S.D.N.Y. bankruptcy court first held that the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (including Section 547) do not apply extraterritorially.  In so holding, the Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2006), which held that Congress intended international application of U.S. fraudulent transfer law.

Next, the S.D.N.Y. Bankruptcy Court ruled that the determination of whether the case involves a domestic or extraterritorial application of section 547 depends on whether the initial transfer came from the United States.  Because the transfer here occurred between a U.S. transferor headquartered in Israel and an Israeli transferee through Israeli bank accounts, the transfer occurred in Israel, and was not domestic.

Therefore, the court concluded that it could not be avoided, and dismissed the trustee’s preference complaint.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

In the recent decision of Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (In re WL Homes LLC, et al.), Adv. No. 11-50839 (BLS) (Bankr. Del. Jan. 10, 2017), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court addressed the affirmative defense of recoupment asserted by an insurer in defense of an adversary proceeding seeking the return of insurance premium overpayments.

Background

The Trustee determined that WL Homes had overpaid its premium obligations for the 2007 to 2009 term by roughly $2.2 million.  The Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Zurich, asserting that he is entitled to turnover of approximately $2.2 million in insurance premium overpayments – called a “return premium” – from Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”).  The Trustee also brought preference claims and sought to disallow claims of defendant.

Zurich defended against turnover by asserting the affirmative defense of recoupment for amounts actually spent defending and settling construction defect claims against WL Homes as insured, and Zurich as insurer.  The Trustee moved for partial summary judgment.

Analysis

Judge Shannon denied the Trustee’s motion.  To start, the Court provided a concise summary of the law of recoupment. “Recoupment is an equitable remedy that permits the offset of mutual debts arising from the same transaction or occurrence.” Slip op. at 5, citing In re Communication Dynamics, Inc., 300 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).

The Trustee argued that recoupment did not apply because the respective debts arose from different parts of the Zurich policy, and because the policy did not contain an express reimbursement clause.

The Court disagreed with the Trustee’s contentions, and found that recoupment applied to the Trustee’s claims.  The Court held that the SIR amount and the premium “are interdependent economic features of the insurance contract[]”, and “form the economic basis of the insurance contract formed between Zurich and WL.”  In addition, the Court found it was unnecessary for the policy to contain an express reimbursement clause for recoupment to apply.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.