On August 23, 2016, Judge Sue L. Robinson of the Delaware District Court issued an Order denying an appellant’s motion for stay pending appeal.   The decision was issued in a appeals arising from the Molycorp Bankruptcy (which is docketed, at case 15-11357 in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court).  The appeals are docketed in the District Court as Case Numbers 16-286 and 16-288.  A copy of the Opinion is available here.

The background of the conflict and the appeal are not the real issue of the Opinion, nor are they necessary for this post.  In short, the parties to the appeal (the “Parties”) disagree on the points of agreements they entered and the appropriateness of the order of the Bankruptcy Court.  What is important for this post, is the actions taken by the Parties after the filing of the appeal.  In particular, the Parties agreed to engage in mediation in September to resolve their disagreement about the percentage of control held by each Party.  Counsel for the appellee represented that it would take no action that would “disparately impact Oaktree.”  Then, on August 11, 2016, Oaktree received solicitation materials which it claimed forced it to pay $2.1 million to retain its 35% stake in the venture, or it would be diluted to a 5.8% stake.  According to the appellee, it had been authorized by the Bankruptcy Court to determine if and when to raise capital, and that the offering was the fairest method possible to raise capital.  Opinion at *4.  This is what lead Oaktree to file the motion for stay pending appeal, as it hoped to have the appeal decided (or at a minimum the mediation conducted) prior to being required to make further investments in this jointly held entity.

Judge Robinson detailed the four-factor test applied to motions for a stay pending appeal, citing to the Third Circuit’s Revel opinion for the principal that:

[T]he most critical” factors … are the first two: whether the stay movant has demonstrated (1) a strong showing of the likelihood of success and (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm – the latter referring to “harm that cannot be prevented or fully rectified” by a successful appeal. . . . Though both are necessary, the former is arguably the more important piece of the stay analysis. As Judge Posner has remarked, it isn’t enough that the failure to obtain a stay will be “a disaster” for the stay movant but only a “minor inconvenience to the defendant,” as “[e]quity jurisdiction exists only to remedy legal wrongs; [thus,] without some showing of a probable right[,] there is no basis for invoking it.

Opinion at *5 (quoting In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015)).  In a quick analysis, Judge Robinson determined that she could not “conclude that Oaktree has demonstrated a
reasonable chance of winning the appeal.”  Opinion at *6.  She also stated that she could not “identify any evidence of record that Oaktree will suffer injuries that cannot be remedied by money damages.”  Opinion at *7.  And with that, she summarily concludes that she could not grant the motion for relief from the automatic stay.

My $.02

A motion for relief from the automatic stay is equitable relief, and it is my experience that courts are reluctant to grant equitable relief when legal (aka financial) relief will make a party whole.  I would think this tends to work against investment concerns.  Money is, after all, fungible.

John Bird is a bankruptcy attorney with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  John is admitted in Delaware and regularly practices before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. You can reach John at (302) 622-4263 or at jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On August 12, 2016, petitioning creditors Beal Bank USA and CLMG Corp. filed an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy petition against Bennu Titan LLC (f/k/a ATP Titan LLC).  The involuntary debtor is affiliated with Bennu Oil & Gas, a deep water oil exploration firm based in Harris County, Texas.

For a link to a brief post discussing involuntary bankruptcies in general, click here.  Under Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor can be “forced” into an involuntary bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C.§ 303(b)(1).  If a company has 12 or more creditors, an involuntary petition requires three or more creditors whose claims are not contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dispute as to either liability or amount to file the petition.

The involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and has been assigned to Judge Laurie Selber Silverstein, Case No. 16-11870.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

The operator of the Fox and Hound, Bailey’s Sports Grille and Champps Kitchen and Bar chains filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Wednesday, August 10th, listing debts that significantly exceeded assets.

Last Call Guarantor LLC and at least eight affiliates (“Debtors”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The filing constitutes the second bankruptcy filing for chain restaurants.

According to the Petition, the Debtors have up to 49 creditors and liabilities of up to $500 million, including more than a half million owed to a food services company based out of Illinois.   Assets were estimated of approximately $50 million.

In 2013, the operator of Fox and Hound and Champps restaurants sought bankruptcy protection. In 2014, a group of lenders led by distressed investor Cerberus Capital Management won bankruptcy-court approval to purchase the chains out of the original bankruptcy filing for more than $120 million, according to the Wall Street Journal.

The First Day Hearing was heard on August 12th.  The Debtors are represented by the law firm of Greenberg Traurig, LLP.  The case number of the lead debtor is Case No. 16-11844-KG. The bankruptcy cases are presiding before the Honorable Kevin Gross.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

 

On August 9, 2016, Judge Kevin Carey of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an Order both dismissing a complaint and striking a defendant’s Notice of Supplemental Authority.   The decision was issued in the Quantum Foods bankruptcy, in the adversary proceeding No. 16-50045.  A copy of the Opinion is available here.

On February 18, 2016, the Committee filed its complaint against the defendant, IPC, seeking to avoid and recover allegedly preferential transfers.  On April 25, 2016, IPC filed the motion to dismiss.  The Committee filed its response on May 23, 2016 and IPC filed a reply on June 6, 2016.  Then, on June 29, 2016, IPC filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority in Support of Motion to Dismiss.  On June 30, 2016 the Committee filed the Motion to Strike the notice of supplemental authority.  Opinion at *2.

Judge Carey quickly covered the standard governing motions to dismiss, which was provided by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and was then distilled into a three-step process by the Third Circuit:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011).  Opinion at *3.  Judge Carey then states that the complaint contains “only a few vague factual allegations,” “fails to allege any facts to support a claim under § 502(d),” and “the information in the exhibit does not provide any context or describe the nature of the transfers.”  Opinion at *4-5.  He then dismissed the complaint.  However, as is the standard for Delaware Bankruptcy judges, he states that “leave to amend a complaint should be freely given when justice so requires” and gives the Committee leave to amend its complaint.  Opinion at *5.

Judge Carey then turns to the motion to strike, looking initially to Local Rule 7007-1(b), which states: No additional briefs, affidavits or other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion shall be filed without prior approval of the Court, except that a party may call to the Court’s attention and briefly discuss pertinent cases decided after a party’s final brief is filed or after oral argument.  Local Rule 7007-1(b).  As IPC did not seek permission for its additional filing, Judge Carey granted the motion to strike without further ado.

One of the first practice pointers I received when I started practicing law was to regularly review the the Local Rules to ensure that I always comply with them.  I have seen the Local Rules violated with regularity, but only with prior court approval.  This is NOT one of those times when it is better to ask for forgiveness than permission.

Defenses to a Preference Action

The Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with many defenses to preference actions. While the efficacy of the preference defendants’ attempt to reduce exposure in this case is still in question, it does not look like it will be an easy decision for the court or a briefly litigated issue.  Other defenses are more common, and more easily gauged.  Included among these are the “ordinary course of business defense” and the “new value defense.” For reader’s looking for more information concerning claims and defenses in preference litigation, attached is a booklet I prepared on the subject: “A Preference Reference: Common Issues that Arise in Delaware Preference Litigation.”

John Bird is a bankruptcy attorney with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  John is admitted in Delaware and regularly practices before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. You can reach John at (302) 622-4263 or at jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On August 4, 2016, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court considered cross-motions for summary judgment in a preference action case styled as Pirinate Consulting Group, LLC v. Maryland Department of the Environment (In re NewPage Corp.), Adv. Pro. No. 13-52206 (KG).  This gem of an opinion is noteworthy in that it analyzes various defenses raised by a state agency to a preference complaint.

Background

Pirimate Consulting Group, LLC, as litigation trustee of the NP Creditor Litigation Trust (“Plaintiff” or “Litigation Trustee”) sought to avoid three separate payments as preferences under section 547(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) against Maryland Department of the Environment (“Defendant” or “MDE”).

The Debtors’ subsidiary, Luke Paper Company operates a mill (the “Luke Mill”) in Maryland that is regulated by various divisions of MDE.  Defendant asserted that “the State’s operating permit program has been in place for decades” and that the Debtors have “been paying the emissions based fee of the type at issue in this case . . . at least since 1997.”  Here, the Trustee seeks to avoid three separate fees paid to MDE.

Under Maryland law, all entities that operate “fuel-burning equipment, statutory combustion turbines, or . . . wood digesters” must obtain a permit.  Accordingly, the Debtors would remit an annual permit-to-operate fee (the “Permit Fee”) in order to maintain their license. The applicable Maryland statute provides that the fee is calculated based upon a “base fee of $200.00 plus an emission-based fee for each ton of regulated emissions from all installations at the plant or facility.”

On July 6, 2011, the Debtor paid the Permit Fee in the amount of $1,597,584 to MDE.  The Debtors have been paying the Permit Fee since at least 2007, and the amount of the fee has ranged from $328,047 to $1,597,584 in 2011.  In addition to the Permit Fee, the Debtors sought to avoid an asbestos license renewal fee in the amount of $750, and a reporting fee of $1,000 under the Federal Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act.

In defense, MDE cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Asbestos Fee was not paid on account of an antecedent debt and that the transfers did not enable it to receive more than it would have in a hypothetical liquidation. Additionally, MDE asserts three affirmative defenses under section 547(c) of the Code – the contemporaneous exchange defense, the ordinary course of business defense, and the de minimis exception. Additionally, MDE argues that 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) prohibits a trustee from recovering environmental compliance fees.  Finally, MDE argues that the doctrine of sovereign immunity insulates it from liability in these proceedings.

Analysis

Asbestos Fee Not Recoverable

To start, Judge Gross found that the Asbestos was not made “on account of an antecedent debt.”  The Court explained that a transfer is deemed “on account of an antecedent debt” if the debtor incurs the liability prior to the alleged preferential transfer.” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2); Stanziale v. S. Steel & Supply, L.L.C. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC), 518 B.R. 269, 277 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). More specifically, courts have held that a debt “is deemed to have been incurred on the date upon which the debtor first becomes legally bound to pay.” Conex, 518 B.R. at 277.

The Court determined that the Debtors did not became legally bound to remit the Asbestos Fee before the Debtors’ payment of such fee.  In this regard, the Court observed that the Debtors had no obligation to renew the license before the expiration date.  The Court also found that MDE’s letter to the Debtors informing of the Debtors about the Asbestos Fee did not trigger an obligation for Debtors to make payment of that amount.  Notably, no services had been provided by MDE prior to submission of the letter.  Thus, the Court found that the Debtors’ payment was not on account of an antecedent debt, and thus not recoverable.

Transfers Protected by Ordinary Course of Business Defense

In analyzing the ordinary course of business defense under Section 547(c)(2), Judge Gross examined the following five factors: “(1) the length of time the parties engaged in the type of dealing at issue; (2) whether the subject transfers were in an amount more than usually paid; (3) whether the payments at issue were tendered in a manner different from previous payments; (4) whether there appears to have been an unusual action by the debtor or creditor to collect on or pay the debt; and (5) whether the creditor did anything to gain an advantage (such as additional security) in light of the debtor’s deteriorating financial condition.” Stanziale v. Indus. Specialists Inc. (In re Conex Holdings, LLC), 522 B.R. 480, 487 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).

With respect to the first factor, the length of time the parties engaged in the type of dealing at issue, the record shows that MDE invoiced the Debtors for at least five (5) years prior to the Petition Date.  Thus the first factor weighed in favor of MDE.

Factor two, whether the subject transfers were in an amount more than usually paid, also weighs in favor MDE. The Asbestos Fee and the Report Fee were constant throughout the historical period – $750 and $1,000 respectively.  The Permit Fee varied considerably, but “[t]he record indicates that the formula for calculating the Permit Fee remained constant throughout the years,” which the Court concluded was the most relevant consideration with respect to this factor.

Factor three, whether the payments at issue were tendered in a different manner than the historical payments, weighed in favor of MDE as neither side has proffered any evidence to suggest payment had been made in a different manner.

Factor four, unusual actions by the debtor or creditor, also weighed in favor of MDE. There was no such evidence.  As to the fifth factor, there was no evidence that MDE attempted to exploit the Debtors’ distressed financial condition or rushed to collect its debt.  Thus, the Court found that the factors weighed in favor of MDE, and each of the transfers were shielded from recovery under the ordinary course of business defense.

Other Defenses

In addition, the Court found that the Asbestos Fee and Permit Fee were shielded by the contemporaneous exchange defense under Section 547(c)(1). Separately, the Court rejected MDE’s defense under 28 U.S.C. Section 959(b), along with MDE’s de minimis exception defense that each transfer should not be aggregated but determined separately whether they exceed the statutory floor of $5,000 under Section 547(c)(9).  Judge Gross noted the majority view that transfers should be aggregated, and there was no reason to depart from this rule especially because the Court separately found that each of the transfers were shielded from recovery under other defenses. Finally, the Court rejected MDE’s sovereign immunity defense, because the U.S. Supreme Court found that such defense is not a bar to preference actions against state agencies.  Cent. Va. Cmty. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359 (2006).

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

On August 2, 2016, Judge Brendan L. Shannon of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Refco Public Commodity Pool, L.P. bankruptcy, Case No. 14-11216.  A copy of the Opinion is available here.  The Opinion holds that this Debtor’s failure to file its taxes was due to reasonable cause, and the associated tax penalties are, therefor, claims that can be excused and disallowed.

Judge Shannon provides extensive background in this case, as the legal issues are highly fact specific and require him to adjudicate the debtor’s tax liability.  Opinion at *6.  The history of the debtor reads like a painful drama.  The partnership invested nearly everything into a managed futures fund (“SMFF”).  Then, SMFF failed, filing for bankruptcy in 2005.  At that point, SMFF’s financial reports and accounting system fell into disarray.  The debtor, claiming that they could not rely upon the financial reports of SMFF, failed to file tax returns for 2006-2008.  Opinion at *16.

The IRS filed a claim asserting a general unsecured claim of $4,112,000 for the fines incurred for failing to file tax returns.  Opinion at *5.  As provided by the Bankruptcy Code, the Court “may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any fine, or penalty relating to a tax…”  Opinion at *6.  According to the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer can obtain a waiver of penalties for failing to file a partnership return if the failure was “due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.”  Opinion at *8.

Here, Judge Shannon held that the debtor’s failure to file its tax returns was reasonable and “arose from events beyond its control.”  Opinion at *12.  The debtor had two options in this instance, file tax returns it believed to be extremely inaccurate, or file no returns.  Because a filer must declare that its tax return is “true, correct, and complete” under penalty of perjury, the debtor was reasonable in not filing its return.  Opinion at *15-16.  Not only was it reasonable before failing to file, it was reasonable after failing.  Opinion at *17.  Both the IRS and the debtor agreed that this was not a case of willful neglect and Judge Shannon agreed.  Opinion at *17.

This is one of a few rare cases in which tax penalties were denied by the Bankruptcy Court.  And as a review of the Opinion shows, it is a highly fact specific inquiry and, if this case is any indicator, requires debtors to meet a high evidentiary burden.  I would recommend that anyone considering filing bankruptcy in an effort to avoid penalties for failing to file their taxes have a thorough discussion with a legal professional as this is a very risky proposition.

John Bird practices with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. You can reach John at 302-622-4263, or jbird@foxrothschild.com.

In a 9-page opinion issued in the Syntax-Brillian case on July 20, 2016, Judge Kevin J. Carey denied the motion of equity holders in Syntax-Brillian seeking to terminate the Liquidation Trustee (the “Trustee”).  A copy of the Opinion is available on the Court’s website: Here.

The Movants seek to terminate the Trustee, arguing that he should be dismissed due to “lack of standing” and “lack of due process”.  Opinion at *4.  The Movants are, in essence, rearguing issues they raise in prior pleadings; that first day affidavits were based on fraud, and as such, all events in the chapter 11 case must be vacated.  Id.  We discussed the opinion that Judge Shannon issued in response to these arguments in a prior blog post: Here.  Quoting Judge Shannon’s opinion, Judge Carey similarly dismisses the Movants’ arguments as to lack of standing.  Opinion at *4-6.

The Movants’ lack of due process argument is, in essence, an argument that the Trustee’s settlement with certain former equity holders was unfair because it did not treat all equity holders the same.  Opinion at *7.  Again, Judge Carey holds that Judge Shannon’s prior opinion addressed this issue, and “the Movants have failed to provide any reason to re-visit that decision.”  Id.

“A party seeking removal of a trustee must prove actual injury or fraud.”  Opinion at *8.  In concluding his Opinion, Judge Carey states:

… the Movants have not proved that they have been harmed by the actions of the Trustee or his professionals. They have not provided any evidence that the Trustee has failed to perform his duties under the Plan and the Liquidation Trust Agreement. There is no evidence of gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and reckless or willful mishandling of the Liquidation Trust Assets by the Trustee.

John Bird practices with the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. You can reach John at 302-622-4263, or jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On July 29, 2016, SLJ Trucking Inc. (“Debtor” or “SLJ”) filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  The Debtor is a licensed and bonded freight shipping and trucking company running freight hauling business from Newark, Delaware.

According to the Petition, the Debtor has less than $50,000 in estimate assets, and between $100,000 and $500,000 in estimated liabilities.  The Section 341 meeting of creditors is scheduled for September 1st at 11:00 a.m. at the J. Caleb Boggs Federal Building, 844 King St., Room 2112, Wilmington, DE.

One way in which creditors can assert their interests is to attend the Section 341 Meeting of Creditors, in order to depose the debtor’s representative regarding the assets and liabilities of the bankruptcy estate.  Creditors may retain counsel to conduct such an examination of the debtor’s representative.  The Section 341 meeting of creditors is an integral component of a bankruptcy proceeding.  Creditors often want to know what information is made available, and what procedures are followed, during a typical meeting of creditors.

General topics that are discussed during a Section 341 meeting can include the following issues:

  • The nature of scope of a debtor’s assets and liabilities;
  • The amount of accounts receivable and accounts payable;
  • To what extent the debtor is able to repay its creditors;
  • Whether insurance remains active;
  • The condition and location of goods received in the 20 days before bankruptcy;
  • The condition and location of goods received in the 45 days before bankruptcy;
  • The debtor’s or trustee’s plan to reorganize its debt or liquidate its assets;
  • The debtor’s plan after it emerges from bankruptcy (not applicable to a Chapter 7 debtor);
  • Whether the debtor experienced any changes in revenue since filing for bankruptcy; and
  • Potential avoidance actions to be commenced by the debtor or trustee.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.

On July 25, 2016, Judge Kevin Carey of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued a thorough decision pursuant to a motion for judgment on the pleadings analyzing the intersection of a preference defendant’s post-petition administrative claim and their preference exposure.  A copy of the Opinion is available here.

In the Opinion, Judge Carey cites the Third Circuit’s Friedman’s decision extensively:  Friedman’s Liquidating Tr. v. Roth Staffing Co., LP (In re Friedman’s, Inc.), 738 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2013).  According to the Friedman’s court, “As articulated by the Third Circuit in Friedman’s, the preference analysis cannot be affected by post-petition activity.”  Further, “The judicial consensus is that setoff is only available in bankruptcy when the opposing obligations arise on the same side of the . . . bankruptcy petition date.”  Opinion at *7.

Judge Carey provides a thorough explanation of the various theories by which preference defendants may attempt to reduce their preference liability through post-petition transfers.  He holds that a post-petition transfer cannot act as new value to reduce a preference payment, but is not prohibited from offsetting a preference payment as both arise post-petition.  Opinion at *7-8.  He then turns to the plaintiff’s argument in its motion for judgment on the pleadings that pursuant to Section 502, the defendant is not entitled to any payment, including administrative payments, until the preference payment is satisfied.  In the Opinion, Judge Carey holds to the contrary, concluding his Opinion with the following quote from the Friedman’s decision:

If it is a rule in bankruptcy that all creditors must be treated equally, surely the exceptions swallow the rule. It could be said that some creditors are treated more equally than others. There are special provisions for aircraft leases and shopping center leases, and some claims are given priority over others. The balancing of interests in, for instance, wage orders, has been held to justify the type of unequal treatment condemned in cases that would include the post-petition payment in the preference analysis. See, e.g., In re Primary Health Sys., Inc., 275 B.R. 709, 709 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding payments pursuant to court order allowing debtor to pay employee wages and benefits to be out of reach of § 547). Inequality per se is not to be avoided; indeed, reasoned and justified inequality sometimes prevails, usually based on what is in the best interest of the estate. For this reason, the courts positing that the interpretation that “results in absolutely equal treatment of all unsecured claims” is the “most reasonable interpretation of section 547(c)(4),”. . . are misguided.

Opinion at *10.

Defenses to a Preference Action

The Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with many defenses to preference actions. While the efficacy of the preference defendants’ attempt to reduce exposure in this case is still in question, it does not look like it will be an easy decision for the court or a briefly litigated issue.  Other defenses are more common, and more easily gauged.  Included among these are the “ordinary course of business defense” and the “new value defense.” For reader’s looking for more information concerning claims and defenses in preference litigation, attached is a booklet I prepared on the subject: “A Preference Reference: Common Issues that Arise in Delaware Preference Litigation.”

John Bird is a bankruptcy attorney with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  John is admitted in Delaware and regularly practices before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. You can reach John at (302) 622-4263 or at jbird@foxrothschild.com.

On July 13, 2016, Appalachian Conventional Production Comp (“Appalachian” or “Debtor”) filed a Chapter 7 liquidation in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  According to the Debtor’s Petition, Appalachian has assets less totaling less than $500,000, and liabilities between $500,000 and $1 million.  Click here to view a copy of Appalachian’s Petition, Schedules of Assets and Liabilities, and Statement of Financial Affairs.

Appalachian previously went by the name of Hayden Harper Energy KA, LLC, which was formed in August 2009 with a focus on the acquisition and development of low-risk conventional oil and gas properties in the Appalachian Basin.

The Debtor’s Section 341 meeting of the creditors is scheduled for August 11, 2016 at 11:00 a.m. at J. Caleb Boggs Federal Building, 844 King St., Room 2112, Wilmington, DE 19801.

Carl D. Neff is a partner with the law firm of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can reach Carl at (302) 622-4272 or at cneff@foxrothschild.com.