Chp. 7 Trustee Files Preference Actions in HomeBanc Mortgage Bankruptcy

George Miller, the Chapter 7 Trustee in the HomeBanc Mortgage bankruptcy, recently filed approximately 400 preference actions against various defendants under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.  According to a Summons filed in one of the adversary actions,  the first pre-trial conference is scheduled in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on April 21, 2010.  The HomeBanc bankruptcy, along with these adversary actions, are before the Honorable Kevin J. Carey,  Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court.

HomeBanc originally filed petitions for relief on August 9, 2007, under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  On February 24, 2009, the cases were converted to chapter 7.  Thereafter, the Office of the United States Trustee appointed George Miller as the Chapter 7 Trustee.  According to documents filed in support of the Debtor's bankruptcy petition, prior to filing for bankruptcy, HomeBanc originated, serviced and sold retail mortgage loans.  HomeBanc also managed and invested in mortgage-backed securities. 

Section 547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code excludes from preference liability payments "made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor."  Judge Carey recently issued a decision that addresses the extent to which a party may rely on the new value defense.  A copy of Judge Carey's decision is available here. 

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Jason Cornell is a bankruptcy attorney in the Wilmington, Delaware office of Fox Rothschild LLP.  You can contact Jason at 302 427 5512, or jcornell@foxrothschild.com.

Creditors Committee in American Home Mortgage Bankruptcy Files Over 90 Preference Actions

Introduction

Earlier this month,  the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "Committee") for American Home Mortgage ("AMH") filed over ninety (90) adversary actions (review one of the Committee's Complaints here).  As reflected in the Complaint,  the Committee alleges that various creditors of AMH received preferential and/or fraudulent transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. sections 547, 548, 550 and 551. 

Procedural Posture of These Cases

At the time of this posting, the Committee had not filed the summonses which would contain information regarding service of process and the initial pretrial conference scheduled by the Court.  Approximately three weeks before filing the preference actions, the Committee sent out demand letters to those parties who its claimed received avoidable preferences during the ninety days prior to AMH's petition date.

AMH filed for bankruptcy on August 6, 2007.  Therefore, the Committee has until early August to file the adversary actions in order to satisfy the statute of limitations.  Although preference actions are often filed by a debtor, the Committee was assigned the right to pursue AMH's preference claims pursuant to the Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Liquidations filed by AMH on November 25, 2008.

These adversary actions are before the Honorable Christopher S. Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware.  For prior posts on this blog regarding issues that arise in preference actions, click here.  To read a post regarding a recent decision by Judge Sontchi in the American Home Mortgage bankruptcy, click here.

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Jason Cornell is a bankruptcy attorney at the law firm Fox Rothschild LLP in Wilmington, Delaware. If you have questions regarding this or any other Delaware bankruptcy proceeding, you may contact Jason at (302) 427-5512 or jcornell@foxrothschild.com.

 

Preference Actions Filed in Custom Foods and Friedman's Bankruptcies

Introduction

The debtor in the Friedman's bankruptcy recently filed preference complaints against various defendants.  Days later,  Charles Stanziale, the liquidating trustee in the Custom Foods bankruptcy, filed preference complaints against various parties as well.  The plaintiffs in both actions seek the avoidance and recovery of alleged preference payments under sections 547 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Given the commencement of these two preference programs,  this post will look at a 2004 decision by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, TWA v. Marsh USA, et. al., (In re TWA), 305 B.R. 228 (Bankr. D.Del. 2004), addressing the pleading requirements in an avoidance complaint.

Background

In TWA, the plaintiff, the post-confirmation estate of TWA,  sought to recover alleged preferential transfers from several defendants.  Defendants sought to dismiss the complaint,  arguing the complaint lacked sufficient information to put the defendants on notice of a cause of action.  Id. at 230-31.  In support of their motion to dismiss, defendants cited the Valley Media decision which addresses the necessary components of a preference complaint.  See Valley Media, Inc., v. Borders, Inc. (In re Valley Media, Inc.), 288 B.R. 189, 192 (Bankr. D.Del. 2003).  In Valley Media, the court found that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a preference complaint must (i) identify the nature and amount of each antecedent debt, and (ii) identify each alleged preferential transfer by date, name of transferor, name of transferee and amount of the transfer.  Id. at 192 (citations omitted). 

Analysis

The Court in TWA found that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient "for a failure to provide the nature and amounts of the debts, dates of payment transactions, amounts of the payment transactions, etc."  TWA at 232-33.  Having found that the complaint was deficient, the court next looked at whether the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the complaint.  Amendments to pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), providing that "[a] party may amend the party's pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served ... Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party;  and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires ..."  Id. at 233.

Defendants argued that the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable and prejudicial to the defendants.  In rejecting this argument, the court recognized that the complaint placed defendants on notice of the "essential issues involved"  and that defendants are "larger sophisticated creditors" that lack any risk that their records would be lost or discarded due to the delay.  Id.  Instead of dismissing the complaint, the court provided plaintiffs with an opportunity to amend.

Conclusion

Judge Walsh's decision in TWA provides a bright line rule as to the contents required for  a properly plead preference complaint.  Plaintiffs in preference actions should identify the amount of each debt, the parties who made and received the transfers, as well as the date and the amount of each transfer.  Any less, and the complaint may be subject to dismissal.

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If you have any questions regarding this, or any other bankruptcy proceeding discussed on the Delaware Bankruptcy Litigation Blog, please contact Jason Cornell, Esquire at (302) 427-5512 or jcornell@foxrothschild.com. 

 

Mortgage Lenders Network Files Preference Actions

Introduction

In January, Mortgage Lenders Network commenced over 65 adversary actions against various defendants, seeking the avoidance and recovery of preferential transfers (read one of the preference complaints here).  As reflected in its complaints,  Mortgage Lenders filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court on February 5, 2007. During the ten years prior to its bankruptcy, Mortgage Lenders grew from a small mortgage company with seven employees, to a residential mortgage provider serving 47 states with over 1,700 employees. 

Given the commencement of Mortgage Lenders' preference program, this post provides a brief summary of the elements and common defenses to preference claims.

Elements to a Preference Claim

In order to establish that a party received a preferential transfer, the plaintiff must prove that payments were received by a creditor on account of an “antecedent debt.” Further, the preferential payments must be made (i.) while the debtor was “insolvent”, (ii.) made within 90 days before the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and (iii.) the payments provide the creditor with more payments than it would receive if the debtor had liquidated under a chapter 7 liquidation.

 

An antecedent debt arises when a party receives a right to payment from the debtor for goods or services.  It is not impossible to prove that a transfer lacked antecedent debt, however, creditors should know that courts often construe the term "debt" broadly. 

To qualify as a preference, the payment must be made while the debtor was “insolvent.” Creditors who seek to prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of payment carry the burden of proving solvency. Further, the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor is presumed insolvent on or during the 90 days leading up to the commencement of the bankruptcy case (often referred to as the 90 day “preference period”). This presumption places the burden on the creditor being sued for the preference payment, not the debtor, to prove that the debtor was solvent at the time of the transfer.  For a more in-depth look at the solvency defense, read here.

To determine whether a payment falls within the 90 day preference period,  count back ninety days from the date the debtor filed for bankruptcy (the petition date).  For preference claims against "insiders" of the debtor, the preference period extends back one year prior to the petition date.

Finally, the plaintiff must show that the creditor received more than it would have received had it not received the payment, but instead received a distribution in a chapter 7 liquidation. Although this sounds convoluted, the intent is pretty clear – in order to show that a creditor received “preferential” treatment by the debtor,  the plaintiff must prove that the creditor’s payment was greater than what the creditor would have received had the debtor liquidated its assets under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Core Defenses to Preference Litigation:   Ordinary Course of Business, New Value and Contemporaneous Exchange

Even if the plaintiff can establish that the debtor made a preferential transfer as defined under the Bankruptcy Code, the party receiving the payment may still avoid returning the money by proving the payment was made in the “ordinary course of business.” The ordinary course of business defense is the most widely used defense to a preference claim. Congress created the ordinary course defense in order to protect recurring, customary credit transactions that are incurred and paid in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the debtor’s customers.

Under the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, it is now easier for creditors to prove payments were made in the ordinary course of business. Under the amended Code, a creditor that receives preferential payments must prove that payment was received in the ordinary of business of the debtor and creditor (the “subjective test”). Alternatively, if the creditor cannot prove that the payments were made according to ordinary business terms between the parties, it can still prevail by showing that the payments were made according to ordinary business terms (the “objective test”). Prior to the 2005 amendments, the creditor had to satisfy both the subjective and objective tests in order to satisfy the ordinary course of business defense. 

A payment is not considered a preference payment if the creditor who received the payment can show that it gave “new value” to the debtor after it received the preferential payment. To establish a new value defense, the creditor must show that it received a preference payment, the creditor then provided the debtor with new value in the form of subsequent goods or services, and the debtor must not have fully compensated the creditor for this subsequent new value.  If you wish to read more on the new value defense, read here.

Creditors can also defend against a preference claim by showing that the payment(s) received from the debtor were contemporaneous exchanges. The contemporaneous exchange defense requires the creditor who received the payments from the debtor provide the debtor with goods or services after receiving payment. Additionally, the creditor and debtor must intend for the payments to be a contemporaneous exchange. Finally, the payments received by the creditor must actually be contemporaneous.

Conclusion

The above provides a generalized introduction to the elements and core defenses of a preference action.  Subsequent posts will explore in greater detail the various components of preference claims.  Besides looking at substantive legal issues, however, it is also important to understand the Delaware Local Rules and General Orders that govern the procedural flow of these cases from beginning to end.  Stay tuned.

Using the Solvency Defense in a Preference Action: In re Bernard Technologies

 Introduction

In a recent opinion issued by the Honorable Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Delaware,  the Court addressed the issue of whether a debtor was solvent when it made allegedly preferential transfers to the Defendant.  The Court's decision provides a helpful analysis of the less frequent "solvency" defense to a preference action.  Further, the decision provides guidance regarding the evidentiary issues that arise when a party raises this defense.

Background

The Court issued its decision in Miller v. Barenberg, et al. (In re Bernard Technologies, Inc.), Adv. No. 06-51017(KG), slip op. (Bankr.D.Del. Dec. 5, 2008).  In Bernard Technologies,  George Miller, the chapter 7 Trustee and plaintiff, sought to recover pre-petition transfers paid to Bernard's former CEO, Dr. Sumner Barenberg (the "Defendant").  As an alleged "insider," the Trustee sought to recover transfers made to the Defendant during the one year prior to Bernard Technologies (the "Debtor") filing for bankruptcy.  One of the defenses raised by the Defendant was that the Debtor was solvent during both the 90 day preference period, as well as the one year preference period applied to insiders.

 

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by recognizing that under 11 U.S.C. § 547(f), the Debtor is presumed insolvent during the 90 days prior to the filing for bankruptcy. The Defendant, however, challenged whether the Debtor was insolvent during the 91st to 365th day prior to filing for bankruptcy (the "Insider Preference Period").  The issue for Court, therefore, was whether the Trustee could prove that the Debtor was insolvent during the Insider Preference Period.

The Court noted that the Trustee did not offer an insolvency report or expert testimony to prove insolvency.  Instead, the Trustee relied upon a partner in his firm who testified after reviewing the Debtor's books and records.  At trial, the Trustee's witness testified that the Debtor was insolvent during the year prior to bankruptcy.  The witness based her testimony, in part, on the Debtor's financial records and a "Balance Sheet Summary" the witness prepared prior to trial.

After considering the evidence, the Court found that the Debtor was insolvent during the one year preference period.   In reaching this conclusion, the Court first looked to § 101(32)(A)'s definition of "insolvent" under the Bankruptcy Code.  The Code defines insolvent as "the financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at fair valuation."  The Trustee's solvency analysis failed to consider the fair market value of Debtor's assets, instead relying on a balance sheet analysis.  The Trustee's lack of proof regarding the Debtor's assets was "problematic" to the Court.

The Court noted that the issue of proving insolvency was previously addressed in Lids Corp. v. Marathon Investment Partners, L.P., (In re Lids Corp.), 281 B.R. 535 (Bankr.D.Del. 2002).  In Lids,  the Court held that the "balance sheet test" is typically applied, however, such a test is based on "fair valuation and not based on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") which are used to prepare a typical balance sheet." Id.  Applying Lids, the Court in Bernard Technologies held that  a "solvency analysis requires asset valuation [of the Debtor]."

Conclusion

Despite the Trustee's reliance on "balance sheet" analysis instead of "valuation," the Court in Bernard Technologies found that the Debtor was insolvent.  It did so for two reasons.  First, the Trustee had the presumption of insolvency during the 90 day preference period and the presumption was not rebutted by the Defendant.  The Trustee also established that the Debtor was unable to "meet its obligations as they came due."  The Defendant, however, did not establish that the Debtor was solvent, nor did it introduce evidence regarding the value of the Debtor's assets.  Based on such evidence, the Court found that the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfers. The clear message from this decision is that when a party is seeking to prove or disprove the solvency of a debtor,  they should present qualified evidence regarding the fair market value of the Debtor's assets.   

 

Dura Automotive Systems Commences Preference Actions

Beginning on October 28, 2008,  Dura Automotive Systems filed approximately 170 avoidance actions pursuant to section 547(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.  Dura Automotive, along with its related entities, filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on October 30, 2006.  The Debtors filed an initial plan of reorganization in August of 2007, however, a revised joint plan was not confirmed until May of 2008. 

Pursuant to the plan of reorganization,  the preference actions stayed with the reorganized Debtors.  The preferences actions, along with the main case, are before the Honorable Kevin J. Carey, Chief Judge of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court.

Click here to read one of the Dura Automotive preference complaints.

To review a form scheduling order often used in Delaware preference actions, click here.